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CIRCUITIES OF PRIORITIES AND LIENS UNDER
SECTION 67c(1) OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT*
THE distribution of an insolvent's estate under the Bankruptcy Act follows
a detailed order of payment designed to implement specific legislative aims.'
After holders of valid secured claims have been paid,2 section 64 allows certain
classes of unsecured creditors to be paid in full before any general distribution
is made.3 Benefiting all unsecured creditors, costs incurred in administering
the estate receive first priority.4 Pre-bankruptcy wage claims have second
priority because they are held by a class thought to need special protection.r
*In re Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 25 U.S.L.
WEEx 3262 (U.S. Mar. 12, 1957) (Nos. 713, 717).
1. Bankruptcy Act § 64, 30 STAT. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1952);
§ 65, 30 STAT. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1952) ; Chandler Act § 67c, 52
STAT. 876 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107c (1952).
2. Except for statutory liens subordinated by § 67c(1), the ordinary order of payment
in bankruptcy is (1) secured claims, (2) priorities and (3) unsecured claims without prior-
ity. See In re Mount Holly Paper Co., 110 F.2d 220 (3d Cir. 1940) ; Middleton v. Fidelity-
Philadelphia Trust Co., 35 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1929). See 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 67.20,
at 188-89 (14th ed., Moore & Oglebay 1956) (hereinafter cited as COLLIER).
3. See 3 COLLIER 1 64.02, at 2058. Section 65 provides for payment of a pro-rata share
of the residue to all allowed but unsatisfied general claims, after assets have been set aside
to pay secured creditors and priority holders under § 64. 3 id. 'f 65.02, at 2285. Section 64
provides:
"[D] ebts which have priority.
(a) The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors
... shall be (1.) the actual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate
* * * the costs and expenses of administration ... ; (2) wages, not to exceed $600 to
each claimant, which have been earned within three months before [bankruptcy], due
to workmen, servants, clerks, or traveling or city salesmen . . . ; (3) where the ...
bankrupt's discharge has been refused, revoked or set aside . . . at the cost and ex-
pense of ... creditors ... the reasonable costs and expenses of such creditors in ob-
taining such refusal, revocation, or setting aside ... ; (4) taxes legally due and owing
by the bankrupt to the United States or any state or any subdivision thereof... ; and
(5) debts owing to any person including the United States, who by the laws of the
United States in [sic] entitled to priority, and rent owing to a landlord who is entitled
to priority by applicable State law: Provided, however, That such priority for rent
... shall be restricted to the rent ... which accrued within three months before the
date of bankruptcy."
"Section 64 not only promotes equality of treatment regardless of regional variations
in the theory of priority, but it provides an important channel for Congressional control
of what may fairly be regarded as the primary aim of bankruptcy legislation-an equitable
distribution of the debtor's assets to his creditors." 3 COLLIER f1 64.02, at 2053-54.
4. Section 64a(1). See 6 REmiNGToN, BANKRUPTCY § 2640 (5th ed. 1952) (herein-
after cited as REINGTON).
5. See Blessing v. Blanchard, 223 Fed. 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1915) (loss of employment
necessitates special status; shop superintendent but not general manager entitled to prior-
ity) ; In re Paradise Catering Corp., 36 F. Supp. 974, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (menial posi-
tion and low income require protection; professional artist denied wage priority) ; In re
Lawsam Elec. Co., 300 Fed. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (ignorance of employer's credit dictates
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Other classes of creditors take third, fourth and fifth priorities.0 But the first
two priorities are given a further advantage. Under section 67c(1), added by
the Chandler Act of 1938, certain secured claims valid against the trustee are
postponed in payment to unsecured claims of costs and wages7 The secured
interests postponed are statutory liens on personalty unaccompanied by pos-
session and liens of a landlord for unpaid rent. Congress subordinated these
secured claims because, often accumulated over a long period, they frequently
exhausted an inordinate share of the bankrupt's estate.8
Section 67c(1)'s selective subordination may create problems apparently
unforeseen by Congress when, in addition to the priorities and the subordi-
nated secured claims, an unsubordinated secured claim exists against the
estate.0 Although ordinarily the unsubordinated secured claim would take
first,') a problem of circuity in distribution occurs when federal or state lien
law requires that the subordinated claim be paid first." Usually there is no
favored treatment; chief designer not a "workman" or "servant"). See also 3 COLLIER
ff 64.201, at 2083. The balance of a wage earner's claim exceeding $600 earned within
three months of bankruptcy will be a general unsecured claim. 3 id. at 2084. See Note,
66 YALE LJ. 449, 460-61 (1957).
6. See note 3 supra. Although a third priority is not a creditor's claim in the strict
sense, only a creditor of the bankrupt can qualify for the priority.
7. Section 67c reads:
"Where not enforced by sale before the filing of a petition [in bankruptcy] ...
(1) . . . statutory liens, including liens for taxes or debts owed to the United States
or to any State or subdivision thereof, on personal property not accompanied by pos-
session of such property, and liens whether statutory or not, of distress for rent shall
be postponed in payment to the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision
(a) of section [64] of this title and such liens for wages or for rent shall be re-
stricted in the amount of their payment to the same extent as provided for wages and
rent respectively in subdivision (a) of section [64]. .. ."
The constitutionality of the section has been sustained against objection that § 67c(1)
deprived a landlord of property without due process of law. In re Jay & Dee Store Co.,
37 F. Supp. 989, 991 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
S. Section 67b validates "statutory liens in favor of employees, contractors, mechanics,
landlords, or other classes of persons, and statutory liens for taxes and debts owing the
United States or to any State or any subdivision thereof ... " Of these, landlords' liens
and tax liens were particularly troublesome:
"The Chandler Act ... adopted the view that a landlord should not be encouraged
to accumulate liens of indefinite extent and thus contribute to building up unsound
financial positions on the part of tenants to the disadvantage of general creditors... [.J
Section 67c accordingly postponed such liens to administrative expebases and to
wages .... "
H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1952). See also 6 REINGTON § 2858, at 473-
74. And, as a result of long inaction of tax authorities, tax liens which had accumulated
over a number of years often consumed a bankrupt's entire estate. 4 COLLIER 67.20, at 189.
9. See 4 id. at 196-97.
10. Seenote2supra.
11. Circuities among liens were early recognized outside bankruptcy. See, e.g., Wil-
cocks v. Wain, 10 S. & R. 380 (Pa. 1824) ; Dyson v. Simmons, 48 Md. 207 (1877) ; Good-
bar & Co. v. Dunn, 61 Miss. 618 (1884); Ferris v. Chic-Mint Gum Co., 14 Del. Ch. 232,
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difficulty in distributing the estate even with all three types of claim present.
The unsubordinated lien (A) takes first, then the priority (B), and finally the
subordinated lien (C).12 But if C is superior to A by applicable lien law, a cir-
cuity occurs. A is paramount to B, which is paramount to C, which in turn is
paramount to A. The following example illustrates the circuity: A holds an
attachment lien, the trustee B claims for costs and wages, and C is the federal
government with a tax lien on personalty unaccompanied by possession. Under
federal lien law, C should be paid before A. 13 In bankruptcy B, ordinarily
paid after A, is superior to C. A circuity results because two inconsistent
standards for determining priority of payment appear to apply.
A recent case in the Third Circuit illustrates varying solutions to the prob-
lem of circuity. In re Quaker City Uniform Co. 1 4 involved chattel mortgagees
who had duly recorded, an unpaid landlord who had distrained on the bank-
rupt's personalty located on the leased premises, and the trustee in bankruptcy
claiming for costs of administration and employees' wages. 1'5 Between the
mortgagee and trustee, the mortgagee should have prevailed since he held a
valid lien normally unaffected by bankruptcy.16 Between trustee and landlord,
the trustee should have prevailed under section 67c (1).17 But by Pennsylvania
124 AtI. 577 (Ch. 1924) ; United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941). On the general
problem, see 4 AAIERICAN LAW or PROPERTY § 17.33, at 624-29 (1952) (isolating seven
types of solution to circuities) ; Benson, Circuity of Lien-A Problem in Priorities, 19
MiNx. L. REv. 139 (1935) (suggesting a comprehensive solution for non-bankruptcy cir-
cuities), see note 56 infra; Kocourek, A First-Rate Legal Puzzle-A Problem in Prior-
ities, 29 ILL. L. REv. 952 (1935) ; Note, 38 CoLtuh. L. Rav. 1267 (1938).
12. See In re Van Winkle, 49 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Ky. 1943) (decision that unsub-
ordinated lien is superior to subordinated lien by applicable lien law avoids circuity) ; cf.
City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U.S. 174 (1919), and In re Brannon, 62 F.2d 959 (5th Cir.
1933) (property subject to secured obligation not part of bankrupt's estate).
13. 4 COLLIER ff 67.24[2]. The tax lien of the federal government is created by INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321.: "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay
the same after demand, the amount ... shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon
all property ... belonging to such person." Section 6322 provides that the lien imposed by
§ 6321 "shall arise at the time the assessment is made. . . ." Section 6323 makes the lien
inoperative against mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers or judgment creditors whose interests
in the property arise before notice is filed as the section prescribes. Whether prior or sub-
sequent in time, the tax lien is superior, however, to attachment liens, United States v.
Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950) ; United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211
(1955), and to all "general liens," United States v. Liverpool & London Ins. Co., 348 U.S.
215 (1955) (garnishment lien) ; United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955) (landlord's
lien perfected by distraint under state law). See Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the
Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE
L.J. 905,929 (1954).
14. 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956), reversing 134 F. Supp. 596 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
15. Although there were two chattel mortgages involved, subsequent references will
be to a single mortgage. The existence of more than one mortgage has no effect on the
circuity.
16. City of Richmond v. Bird, 249 U.S. 174 (1919) ; In re Brannon, 62 F.2d 959 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 742 (1933) ; 3 COLLIER 1 64.02, at 2055; see note 3 supra.
17. See note 7 snpra. and accompanying text.
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law, which gives the landlord's lien of distraint for rent priority over the mort-
gage, the landlord should have taken before the mortgagee.' 8 Apparently rely-
ing on a policy favoring protection of secured creditors, the referee in bank-
ruptcy ordered that the mortgagee be paid in full before the other claimants
were satisfied under section 67c (1).19 The district court, implicitly recognizing
the circuity problem, went a step further. Accepting in part the referee's dis-
tribution, it permitted the landlord to be satisfied from the fund set aside for
the mortgagee.20 In this manner the court attempted to satisfy state law. The
court of appeals reached a third solution. It paid costs and wages first, then the
landlord, and finally the mortgagee. Reading section 67c(1) broadly, it held
that the mortgagee was subordinated to the landlord and therefore to the trus-
tee "by necessary implication."
'2 1
The difficulties confronting the various courts in Quaker City have troubled
other bankruptcy courts, whether the circuity was created by state lien law, as
in the instant case, or by federal legislation. Thus, in two cases, bankruptcy
18. See In re Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155, 157 (3d Cir. 1956). PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 68, § 250.302 (Purdon Supp. 1956) confers the lien by distraint on the personalty
of the tenant. Sections 321. and 322 preserve the landlord's lien after the goods come into
possession of a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy, and give the landlord a right to priority
of satisfaction from the proceeds of an execution. These sections have been uniformly con-
strued to mean that a distraining Pennsylvania landlord has priority over chattel mort-
gagees, even where the mortgagee has filed notice before the landlord distrains. In re
Mount Holly Paper Co., 110 F.2d 220 (3d Cir. 1940) ; In re De Lancey Stables Co., 1.70
Fed. 860 (E.D. Pa. 1909) ; Reinhart v. Gerhardt, 152 Pa. Super. 229, 31 A.2d 737 (1943) ;
National Cash Register Co. v. Ansell, 125 Pa. Super. 309, 189 Atl. 738 (1937) ; Commer-
cial Credit Plan v. Mahoney, 67 Pa. D. & C. 577 (C.P. 1948). Cf. Matter of Townsend,
31 REF. J. 54 (1957) (Ref. E.D. Pa. 1956), holding a "security interest" sub'ordinated to
a landlord who had not distrained, and who had only a priority for rent, as distinguished
from a lien, under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 96 (Purdon Supp. 1956).
Pennsylvania adopted the Uniform Commercial Code in 1954, id. tit. 12A, § 10-101 (Pur-
don 1954), rewriting its commercial law to a great extent. Existing security devices, like
the chattel mortgage, were not abolished, but merely brought under the rules of the Code.
Id. § 9-102, at 336 (Code comment). Although all prior laws inconsistent with the pro-
visions of the Code were repealed, id. §§ 10-102-103, the priorities given a landlord over
holders of security interests such as the chattel mortgage appear to remain intact, id. § 9-
310, at 428-29 (Pa. Bar Ass'n notes) ; Herman v. Osgood, 103 P.L.J. 231 (County Ct. Pa.
1955) ; Matter of Townsend, supra.
Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have statutes substantially similar to
that of Pennsylvania giving a landlord a first lien, although some statutes apply only to
personalty, some to crops, and some to both. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 31, §§ 15, 29 (Supp.
1955) (crops and personalty), Colvin v. Payne, 218 Ala. 341, 118 So. 578 (1928) ; FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 83.08 (Supp. 1956) (same), Pillans & Smith Co. v. Lowe, 117 Fla. 249, 157
So. 649 (1934) ; IowA CODE ANN. § 570.1 (Supp. 1956) (crops and personalty), Dilen-
beck v. Security Sav. Bank, 186 Iowa 308, 169 N.W. 675 (1918); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 67-
524 (1949) (crops), Shell v. Guthrie, 129 Kan. 632, 284 Pac. 420 (1930).
19. Opinion of the Referee, reprinted in Brief for Appellant, pp. 14a-22a, In re Quaker
City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956). For discussion of the referee's opinion,
see note 35 infra.
20. 134 F. Supp. at 598.
21. 238 F.2d at 159-60.
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courts were confronted with a circuity when a state tax lien accompanied by
possession, the trustee's claims for costs and wages, and a federal tax lien un-
accompanied by possession conflicted. Under lien law, the federal tax lien was
superior to the state lien. Under 67c(1), the federal lien was inferior to the
cost and wage claims. One court ordered full payment of the state's claim
first,22 while the other restricted the state's recovery to the fund available less
the amount claimed by the federal lien.23 In other cases, as in Quaker City,
consensual liens conflicted with claims of the trustee and with state statutory
liens unaccompanied by possession.24 Again, under similar facts, different dis-
tributions were ordered.25 And, whether recognizing the circuity or not, the
courts seldom gave sound reasons for their distributions. While all the decisions
involved proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act, none undertook a thorough
analysis of section 67c(1) and its underlying policies, by which the ultimate
order of distribution should be determined.
Any consideration of section 67c (1) to determine the most desirable distri-
bution of assets in circuity situations should attempt to balance the three main
interests affected. The section explicitly treats two of these: the interests of
cost and wage claimants and of the states and federal government in preserving
a prescribed order of payment among lienholders. The third interest, that of a
lienor unsubordinated by section 67c(1), is affected implicitly by the section;
such creditors are concerned in the distribution ordered only when, as in
Quaker City, circuities occur. Congress clearly intended to benefit unsecured
claims for wages and administrative costs in giving them preference to certain
statutory lienholders. But the section's failure to regulate the priority of liens
inter se suggests that weight be given to state and federal lien law whenever
possible.2 6 True, Congress did not intend to retain non-bankruptcy lien prior-
22. In re Ann Arbor Brewing Co., 110 F. Supp. 111 (E.D. Mich. 1951) (city, county
and district taxes paid first, then costs and wages before federal tax lien superior to other
tax liens under federal law). Admitting the case was difficult, the court held that the
possessory state liens were "not to be subordinated to administration expenses and labor
claims ... ," giving no further reason for the decision. Id. at 117.
23. California Dep't of Employment v. United States, 210 F.2d 242, 244 (9th Cir. 1954).
The court set aside an amount equal to the federal tax lien, paying the priorities from that
amount. Since the federal lien exceeded the fund, nothing was left for the state liens
accompanied by possession.
24. See New Orleans v. Harrell, 134 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943) (chattel mortgage paid
first, then costs and wages before city tax lien superior to mortgagee under state law) ;
It re Empire Granite Co., 42 F. Supp. 450 (M.D. Ga. 1942) (bill of sale to secure a debt
paid first, then costs and wages, then state tax liens superior to bill of sale under state law;
but the amount recovered under the bill of sale was limited to the fund minus the superior
tax liens).,
25. The cases cited in note 24 supra both arose in the Fifth Circuit. In Enpire Granite
the district court paid the unsubordinated lienor first, but only to the extent of the fund
minus the liens superior under state law. 42 F. Supp. at 458. Although approved in
Feigenbaum, Tax Problems, 25 REF. J. 107, 111. (1951), the case had been implicitly over-
ruled by the court of appeals in Harrell, which paid the unsubordinated lienor first out of
the full fund. 134 F.2d at 400.
26. See 4 CouamR f 67.27, at 296; 4 id. f1 70.70, at 1347 (Supp. 1956).
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ities unqualifiedly,27 since some statutory liens are subordinated under 67c(1)
and may even be invalidated under 67c(2) .28 But to the extent a lien sub-
ordinated by section 67c(1) is not invalidated by section 67c(2), a state or
federal interest in preserving a priority of liens exists. Moreover, for those
liens invalidated as well as subordinated, a substituted interest in maintaining
lien priority arises in the trustee, representing the bankrupt's estate, since
section 67c(2) "preserves" invalidated liens and the excess of restricted sub-
ordinated liens for the benefit of general creditors. 29 For example, the land-
lord's lien in Quaker City, limited in payment to three months' rent,30 is one
of those section 67c(1) restricts, the trustee obtaining an interest in the excess
of the lien over three months rent; a similar interest exists as to liens entirely
invalidated, such as state tax liens.31 Accordingly, two interests are dealt with
by section 67c(1) : that in protecting cost and wage priorities and that in re-
27. See note 7 supra.
Section 67c(2) provides:
".... statutory liens created or recognized by the laws of any state for debts owing
to any person, including any State or subdivision thereof, on personal property not
accompanied by possession of, or by levy upon or by sequestration or distraint of, such
property, shall not be valid against the trustee.... The court may on due notice order
so much of any lien in excess of the restricted amount under clause (1) of this sub-
division and any lien invalid under clause (2) of this subdivision to be preserved for
the benefit of the estate and, in any such event, such lien for the excess and such in-
valid lien ... shall pass to the trustee."
66 STAT. 428, 11 U.S.C. § 107c(2) (1952).
28. Certain classes of liebs subordinated by clause (1) are not invalidated by clause
(2) : federal statutory liens on personalty unaccompanied by possession; state statutory
liens unaccompanied by possession, but accompanied by levy, sequestration or distraint;
and landlord's liens of distress for rent. 4 COLLIER 1 67.281, at 311-12. Because most state
liens would also be possessory if accompanied by levy, sequestration or distraint, the chief
group of liens subordinated without invalidation are federal. All liens subject to invalida-
tion by clause (2) would be subject to subordination under the broader language of clause
(1). Ibid.
29. See note 27 supra. "Preservation" assures that funds from an invalidated lien will
benefit general creditors, rather than a junior lienholder. See 4 COLLIER 67.281, at 314.
30. There is some doubt whether a landlord may claim three months' rent as a lien-
holder, while retaining priority status for an additional three months' rent. Section 64a(5)
restricts the landlord's priority to rent "owing for the actual use and occupancy of the
premises, and which accrued within three months before the date of bankruptcy." Section
67c(1) restricts the landlord's lien in the amount of its payment to the same extent the
priority is restricted by the earlier section. The two sections read together seem to call
for a disallowance of the priority claim when payment of the lien has satisfied the three
months covered. This result accords with congressional disapproval of preferential treat-
ment granted landlords by the states. See 6 REmINGT x § 2858. But at least one court
has awarded a landlord his priority claim in addition to his lien. In re Alien, 92 F. Supp.
717 (S.D. Tex. 1950), criticized in 4 COLLIER ff 67.28, at 308 n.17a.
31. Cf. Matter of Gordon, 27 Rxr. J. 85 (1953) (Ref. E.D. Mich. 1952) (invalidating
city, county and state tax liens unaccompanied by possession or process). But Cf. 4 COLLIER
ff 67.281, at 312-13, suggesting but rejecting an ambiguity in the term "debts" in § 67c(2)
which might lead a court to exclude state tax liens from the invalidation provision of the
section.
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taining the order of lien priorities, whether claimed by the subordinated lienor
orthe trustee under section 67c(2).
Finally, section 67c(1)'s subordination of some statutory liens seems to in-
dicate acceptance of the prior rights of consensual secured creditors, judicial
lienors and unaffected statutory lienors. In allowing such creditors to take
first, the Bankruptcy Act implies that their expectations should be satisfied
before those of general creditors. This approach displays a concern for the
creditor who gives value on the basis of specific security or attaches specific
property and, in a broader sense, for protection of the credit market.3 2 Thus
the mortgagee may expect his claim to be superior to those of general creditors.
He knowingly incurs the risk, however, that local law will give preference to
another lien, although subsequently perfected.33 With the amount of the mort-
gage as an upper limit, the mortgagee's expectation is therefore the value of
the property less the amount of any state-created lien taking precedence over
his claim.3 4 A solution is needed to satisfy concurrently the intent of Congress
to benefit cost and wage claimants, the demand of state and federal govern-
ments to maintain their lien priorities, and the expectation of unsubordinated
lienors to be paid before general creditors.
Although each distribution in Quaker City is based on some statutory or
policy foundation, none adequately reconciles the three conflicting interests.
Initially, the referee declared the mortgagee's claim unaffected by sections 64
and 67 of the act, the mortgaged property not being part of the bankrupt's
estate. To support full payment of this claim first he apparently reasoned in
two steps. He cited cases which indicated that he considered the landlord's
lien not perfected in a federal sense, regardless of state law, because section
67c(1) subordinated this lien to the first two priorities.35 Then, in order to
subordinate the landlord's superior lien to the mortgage, he held the land-
32. Cf. the 1950 revision of § 60, 64 STAT. 24 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1952), dealing
with the "preference" problems arising out of such cases as Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank v.
Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), and In re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mo.
1943). See H.R. REP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949).
Section 67c(1) itself attaches some significance to the specificity concept by subordinat-
ing only liens unaccompanied by possession and unlimited in their application to a debtor's
property. See notes 7 and 8 supra.
33. See OsBORNE, MORTGAGES § 221, at 596-97 (1951):
"There are a considerable number of liens ... which are created, or at least notice
of which is provided for, by statute that constitute risks of which a mortgagee must
take account.... The hazards of ... displacement constitute a normal risk that the
mortgagee runs and enters into his calculations."
See note 18 supra.
34. Hereinafter, references to the mortgagee's or other unsubordinated lienor's ex-
pectation will assume that the property is insufficient to satisfy all liens.
35. Opinion of the Referee, reprinted in Brief for Appellant, pp. 14a-22a, In re Quaker
City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956). The referee pointed to cases in which a
federal tax lien was held superior to a "general" lien. E.g., United States v. Scovil, 348
U.S. 218 (1955) (landlord's lien by distraint inferior to tax lien), and other cases cited
note 14 supra. These cases, however, appear unnecessary to subordinate the landlord to
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lord's lien unperfected as to the lien of the mortgagee as well.36 His approach
thus avoided the circuity by disregarding the state-determined lien priority.
Since the referee's solution pays a mortgagee in full, even though his expecta-
tion is only the fund less the landlord's lien, the mortgagee receives a windfall
at the expense of other claimants whenever the fund is less than the sum of
the mortgagee's and landlord's claims.3 7 Moreover, even though section 67c(1)
attempts to benefit the priorities, the mortgagee's windfall is at the expense of
the priorities when the fund is also less than the sum of the mortgage and
priorities.38
In an effort to reconcile state law with the provisions of section 67c (1), the
district cot'rt paid the mortgagee first but allowed the landlord to take from
that amount.39 The priorities were paid next. This distribution permitted the
landlord to do indirectly what he could not have done directly-take before the
priorities.4 0 Furthermore, since the mortgagee's expectation equals the fund
the priorities in Quaker City, since § 67c(l) dictates as much. The referee apparently re-
lied on the tax cases to indicate he was free to hold the landlord's lien unperfected as to
the chattel mortgage, since its perfection was determined by federal law. See note 36 infra.
36. After discussing the cases cited in notes 14 and 35 supra, the referee said:
"The foregoing review of authorities has been made because the position of lien
clainants and priority claimants must be viewed in the light of the federal law. If the
state law were to prevail ... the Pennsylvania distribution would be as follows:
"1. Landlord
2. Chattel mortgages
3. Wage claims... [citing cases]
"Accordingly, the Referee... holds that the chattel mortgages ... must be first
paid.... Second to be paid out will be administration expenses, then come.., the...
wage claims and then the landlord."
Brief for Appellant, In re Quaker City Uniform Co., supra note 35, at 21a. (Emphasis
added.)
37. Although the circuity existed as to the specific property mortgaged, the word
"fund" is hereinafter used, since in Quaker City the property was sold and the proceeds
constituted the bulk of the bankrupt's estate. 238 F.2d at 157 n.l.
38. Assume a fund of 3, a mortgage of 3, priorities of 2 and a landlord's lien of 2.
Outside bankruptcy, the mortgagee would take only 1-what remained after paying the
landlord in full. The referee's distribution gives the mortgagee the entire fund. If the fund
were 5 or more however, this solution would not confer a windfall on the mortgagee, since
he could expect full payment outside bankruptcy.
39. It does not appear in the district court's opinion what standing the mortgagee
would have for the unsatisfied portion of his claim. Presumably the mortgagee would be
subrogated to the rights of the landlord and take after costs and wages. But if the land-
lord had not recovered his entire claim from the amount paid the mortgagee, the court's
concern for state law suggests that the landlord would be paid in full before the mortgagee
could take at all. In fact, the court indicated the landlord would take, but did not discuss
the mortgagee's position. 134 F. Supp. at 598.
40. Assume a fund of 3, a mortgage of 3, priorities of 2 and a landlord's lien of 2. See
note 38 supra. The district court's distribution gives the mortgagee 1 and the landlord 2.
Costs and wages get nothing, and it might be suggested that this is proper, since they were
subsequent to a claim (the mortgage) which equalled the fund. Yet the result clearly pre-
fers the landlord, who is paid in full, to the priority holders, who get nothing.
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less the landlord's lien, the district court's distribution, giving him his mort-
gage less the landlord's lien, will prejudice his expectation whenever the fund
is greater than the mortgage.41 This interpretation thus subordinates not the
landlord, but the mortgagee to the priorities, to the extent his claim is paid to
the landlord.42
The court of appeals was of the opinion that section 67c (1) could be satis-
fied only by subordinating everyone to costs and wages. Because the mort-
gagee was inferior to the landlord under state law, and the landlord was in-
ferior to the priorities under section 67c(1), the mortgagee was held subor-
dinated to the priorities as well as to the landlord.43 This distribution gives
greatest weight to the policy of benefiting claimants for costs and wages. 44 But
41. For example, if the fund was 6 and the mortgagee, priority holders and landlord
each claimed 3, the mortgagee could expect full payment outside bankruptcy. Yet the dis-
trict court's distribution leaves him nothing.
42. If the fund was 6, and the mortgagee, priority holders and landlord each claimed
3, outside bankruptcy the landlord and mortgagee each take 3. In bankruptcy, the landlord
and priorities each take 3.
43. 238 F.2d at 159-60.
In an opinion subsequently withdrawn, the court held originally that in Pennsylvania
a chattel mortgage was a statutory lien within the meaning of § 67c(1) and was thus
explicitly subordinated to the priorities. 2 CCH BANKR. L. REP. (4th ed.) ff 58778 (3d
Cir. 1956). The holding that the chattel mortgage is a statutory lien avoided the circuity
problem by placing mortgagee and landlord in the same category of claimants subordinated
to the first two priorities, where state law could govern between them without difficulty.
But a chattel mortgage is not a statutory lien. See 4 CoLmERx 1 67.20, at 184-85; New Or-
leans v. Harrell, 134 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943) (implicit holding) ; cf. In the Matter of
Tele-tone Radio Corp., 133 F. Supp. 739, 748 (D.N.J. 1955) (factor's lien not "statutory"
lien). And faced with the possibility that a chattel mortgage might be invalid against the
trustee under § 67c(2) if held a statutory lien within the meaning of § 67c(1), the court on
rehearing ordered the same distribution, but under the "necessary implication" theory. 238
F.2d at 159. It was thus no longer necessary to decide the statutory lien question. Id. at
157.
44. In support of the necessary implication theory, the court cited only one case, It re
Michael's Cafeteria, 49 F. Supp. 657, vtodified on rehearing, 52 F. Supp. 799 (W.D. La.
1943) ; see 238 F.2d at 160 n.7. But Michael's, although not entirely clear, does not appear
to support the proposition it was cited for. The bankrupt's landlord held a rent lien
superior to a chattel mortgage, which was in turn superior to a federal government tax
priority. The chief question was whether the landlord could take his entire claim, or
whether he was restricted to three months' rent. At that time, § 67c(1) allowed the land-
lord only three months' rent "except as against other liens." 52 STAT. 877 (1938). See
In re Eakins Lumber Co., 39 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. W. Va. 1941). 'The court first allowed
the landlord to take three months' rent plus the amount of the inferior mortgage, leaving
the remainder of the fund for the tax priority. 49 F. Supp. at 658. On rehearing, the court
decided that the Chandler Act did not apply, since the lease antedated its enactment. Cost
and wage priorities were paid; the landlord then took the entire remainder of the fund to
satisfy his rent lien.
Michael's Cafeteria has been interpreted as "apparently" subordinating a mortgagee
to "administrative and wage claims" of § 64. 4 COLLIE f 67.27, at 297 n.41. But neither
opinion in that case considered the status of cost and wage priorities, and the mortgagee
involved did not appeal to contest his "subordination" to those claimants. In fact, it was
[Vol. 66
NOTES
since the mortgagee is paid only his expectation (the fund less the landlord's
lien) less the priority claims, the distribution impairs that expectation when-
ever the fund is insufficient to satisfy all claims.4 5 Moreover, the "necessary
implication" rationale has no compelling logic in terms of statutory language;
it could equally well be argued-as the referee assumed-that by its silence
Congress intended the mortgagees to be paid in full first.40 Nor is the implica-
tion "necessary" in the sense that no other distribution could better satisfy the
conflicting interests implicit in section 67c(1).
The most satisfactory solution pays the unsubordinated lienor's expectation
first and then applies section 67c(1) to the interests it explicitly affects. 47 The
priorities, paid next from the remaining fund, are subordinated only to an in-
terest against which they were never considered to have a prior claim. Con-
ceptually, the subordinated lien is preserved above the unsubordinated lien for
the benefit of the priorities. This achieves an effect consistent with the intent
of section 67c(1).48 The priorities recover from the very fund provided for
alleged that the mortgagee had been paid by an endorser of the mortgage. The endorser
did not appear, although he would have been subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee.
52 F. Supp. at 800. Thus, the apparent subordination of the mortgagee to the priorities
relied on by the Third Circuit was never adequately considered, nor is there any indication
what the Michael's Cafeteria court would have held, had they been presented with the
issue.
45. Assume a fund of 6, with claims of 3 apiece by a mortgagee, priority holder and
landlord. See note 41 supra. The court of appeals' distribution would give the mortgagee
nothing. If the landlord's lien had been 6, however, even though the amount taken would
be the same, the mortgagee could not complain.
46. In an early case, Andrus v. Burke, 61 N.J. Eq. 297, 299, 48 Atl. 228, 229 (Ch.
1901), one judge remarked that he was "taught while a law student that the legal puzzle
presented by the [circuity] situation was insoluble on any known principles." Thus the
characteristic approach of courts has been to break the circle at random. Benson, Circuity
of Lien--A Problem in Priorities, 19 Mirr. L. REV. 139, 146 (1935). The "necessary
implication" rationale does just that. Its reasoning is intuitively syllogistic: A is prior to
B; B is prior to C; therefore A is prior to C. One difficulty with this approach is that
the results vary depending on which letters the courts ascribe to the different parties. While
the referee in Quaker City treated the mortgagee as A, costs and wages as B and the land-
lord as C, the court of appeals treated costs and wages as A, the landlord as B and the
mortgagee as C.
47. The text proposal was indicated in California Dep't of Employment v. United
States, 210 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1954), explaining the distribution on the theory that "§ 67
sub. c does not affect or impair the priorities of liens recognized by § 67 sub. b" There
state tax liens were superior to administrative costs, which were superior to a federal tax
lien subordinated by § 67c(1), and the court found the federal lien superior to the state
liens. The court paid the federal lien first, allowing the priorities to be satisfied from this
amount. Because the federal lien exceeded the fund available, the state took nothing; yet
the court indicated that had the federal lien been less than the fund, the state would have
taken the remainder. Id. at 244.
See also In re Empire Granite Co., 42 F. Supp. 450 (M.D. Ga. 1942), adopting a similar
solution, discussed at note 25 supra.
48. In Quaker City the court of appeals considered and rejected the proposed solution:
"The difficulty presented by this solution is that the superior lien will be defeated
to the extent of the administrative expenses and wage claims .... The wage claims
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
them; the unsubordinated lienor is not affected by 67c(1) which was not in-
tended to reach him. Only the subordinated lienor, whether actually repre-
sented by the lienholder or by the trustee substituted for him, may seriously
object to this distribution. Although preferred under ordinary lien law, he is
never paid in full, and under some facts the unsubordinated lienor may be paid,
while the subordinated lienor is unsatisfied.49 However, he is adversely affected
only to the advantage of the priorities, a result consistent with the tenor of the
section. In Quaker City, for example, the mortgagee does not benefit at the
expense of the landlord's ultimate claim for three months rent and the trustee's
claim for the excess since the mortgagee receives only the share remaining had
the landlord taken outside bankruptcy.50 Finally, the unsubordinated lienor is
asserted in this case would consume the entire amount set aside for the landlord and
even worse than the fear of merely upsetting state lien priority, the application of the
rule in this case would completely destroy the superior state lien."
238 F.2d at 159. But § 67c(1) specifically intends the defeat of the landlord's lien for the
benefit of administrative expenses and wage claims. H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 13 (1952). Moreover, although the court rejected California Dep't of Employment,
smpra note 47, because the superior lien would be "destroyed," the "necessary implication"
solution also dictated first payment to costs and wages, the landlord taking nothing. 238
F.2d at 160.
49. Three types of subordinated lien may be adversely affected by the proposed solu-
tion: federal tax liens on personalty, state and local statutory liens unaccompanied by pos-
session, but accompanied by levy, sequestration or distraint, and landlords' liens of distress
for rent. See note 31 supra. Of these, a landlord may have no complaint if the fund is
great enough to satisfy his claim for three months rent-the maximum allowed by § 67c(1)
-after payment of the unsubordinated lienor's expectation and the priorities. In general,
however, after payment of the unsubordinated lienor's expectation (fund minus subordinated
lien) only an amount equal to the subordinated lien remains for distribution. The existence
of any priority claims for costs and wages will diminish the subordinated lienor's share pro
tanto. Further, if the fund is less than the priorities plus the unsubordinated lienor's ex-
pectation, the subordinated lienor takes nothing. For example, if the fund were 3, and the
claims of the mortgagee, priority holder and landlord each 2, the mortgagee would take 1
and the priority holder 2, leaving nothing for the landlord.




Chattel Mortgagee (1) $ 3,480.00 $ 3,480.00
Chattel Mortgagee (2) 2,612.80 2,612.80
Costs and Wages 11,738.13 3,803.97
Landlord 3,641.07
$ 9,896.77
Both mortgagees are paid in full because they expected to receive full payment outside
bankruptcy. But this is not to say what the referee implied-that the mortgagee should be
paid first in any case. For example, if the amounts claimed by the landlord and first mort-




not prejudiced, for when his expectation is less than his full claim, he is a gen-
eral creditor for the difference.rl
The proposed method of distribution seemingly encourages accumulation of
the subordinated lien. With a given fund, the unsubordinated lienor's expecta-
tion varies inversely with the size of the subordinated lien until the latter equals
the fund. Consequently, any reduction in the unsubordinated lienor's expecta-
tion, which would result from accumulation of the subordinated lien, leaves
greater assets remaining for other distributees, including the subordinated
lienorY2 It is doubtful that the inducement factor would be strong, however.
Pressures exist to prevent the subordinated lienor from allowing his claim to
accumulate. In the case of a landlord, he will prefer to foreclose his lien, evict
the tenant, and re-rent to one who does not appear to be insolvent. Further,
since section 67c (1) restricts the landlord's lien to three months rent and the
trustee takes the excess, the landlord has little to gain by allowing accumulation
beyond that amount plus the amount of cost and wage claims.r3 And because
he will always be uncertain of the exact amount of these priorities, attempts to
determine the best time to foreolose would be hazardous. All other subordi-
nated liens save one are likewise invalidated at least in part; only a federal
statutory lien-normally for taxes-is not affected by section 67c(2).r 4 But
because the federal lien occupies a varying position as against other liens, de-
pending on their nature and date of recordation,5 5 the existence of substantial
motivation to accumulate rather than foreclose is questionable. Thus, the de-
pendence of one claimant's share upon the size of other claims should not im-
51. Bankruptcy Act § 57h, 30 STAT. 560 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 93h (1952). See United
States Nat'l Bank v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 331 U.S. 28 (1947) ; 3 CorIza-R 1 57.07, at 149-57,
57.20, at 255-59.
The problem of how to treat the unpaid portion of an unsubordinated lien arises only
where the fund remaining after payment of his expectation is more than enough to pay
cost and wage claims and the uninvalidated subordinated lien. The unsubordinated lienor
can take only as a general creditor from the invalidated lien since § 67c(2) preserves it
for general creditors. After the priorities are paid in full, the subordinated lienor will have
first claim against any residue. There is no longer any reason to pay the unsubordinated
lienor, who has already recovered his non-bankruptcy expectation, until the claimant
superior under non-bankruptcy law is satisfied.
52. By the same reasoning, costs and wages benefit to a greater degree from an increase
in the subordinated lien since they will take first out of the fund remaining after payment
to the unsubordinated lienor. Where the subordinated lien is also invalidated, the general
creditors benefit by any increase, since the invalidated lien will be preserved by the trustee.
53. Section 67c(1) provides: "liens for ... rent shall be restricted in the amount of
their payment to the same extent as provided . . . in subdivision [a] of section 64....
But in computing the mortgagee's expectation outside bankruptcy, the total amount of the
landlord's lien allowed by state law should be considered, and not only the amount accru-
ing within three months of bankruptcy. The mortgagee cannot complain of this treatment,
since he should be neither harmed nor benefited by § 67c(1).
54. Unless nonpossessory state liens are accompanied by levy, sequestration or dis-
traint, they are invalidated by § 67c(2). See note 28 supra.
55. See note 13 supra.
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pede acceptance of the proposed solution, particularly when it furthers the
objective of fulfilling the parties' expectations to the fund.5 6
56. A solution based entirely on the parties' expectations is proposed by Benson, Cir-
cuity of Lien-A Problem in Priorities, 19 MiNN. L. Rav. 139 (1935). Benson suggests
that each party in a circuity stands in the position of a junior lienholder, and should be
paid on the basis of his expectation-the fund less any claims directly superior to his claim.
Although criticized for its complexity (Kocourek, supra note 11, at 953) Benson's solution
appears desirable in non-bankruptcy situations. In a § 67c(l) circuity, however, the solu-
tion leads to results not reconcilable with the congressional intent to subordinate selected
liens to costs and wages. If the unsubordinated lien is equal to the fund, the priorities have
no expectation, and by Benson's solution might take nothing while the subordinated lien
might be paid, even in full. For example, with a fund of 3, a chattel mortgage of 3, costs
of 1 and a landlord's lien of 2, the chattel mortgage expects and receives 1, since he is in-
ferior to a claim of 2. The landlord expects and receives 2, since he is inferior to a claim
of 1. Costs, on the other hand, expect and take nothing, since they are inferior to a claim
equaling the fund.
